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( i ) 
FOREWARD 
The OBCS Authority^ comprised of the Heads of 
Government of the Eastern Caribbean States, decided at the 
Second Meeting that fuller Cuetoma Vnion conditions bhoutd 
be established to serve the seven island group that forms 
the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (DECS). The 
objective was to be achieved through an up-grading in the 
operations of the East Caribbean Common Market (ECCM). 
This paper which brings together some of the findings 
from a preliminary overview of the situation in the ECCM, 
and a review of customs unions concepts, identifies a range 
of issues and options that are pertinent to deepening the 
customs union relationship, To the extent that this paper 
facilitates a fuller articulation of the Authority's decision^ 
its purpose would be served. 
S. St. A. Clarke 
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JNTEODUCTORY 
This document brings together the several aspects 
highlighted in the summary papers offered to the OECS 
Secretariat on the subject of Customs Union operations. Pre-
paration of those summary papers was stimulated by decisions 
of The Authority of OECS concerning^ first establishment of 
Customs Union operations; and second, inclusion of the subject 
as a priority in the Medium Term Programme of Work (1984 - 89) 
that forms the Annex to the Memorandum of Understanding con-
cluded between the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Lation America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), and the Organisation 
of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), 
The mandate of the OECS Heads of Government requires 
examination of considerations relating to deeper Customs Union 
operations among the member States of the OECS. It is there-
fore relevant to take account that the Eastern Caribbean 
Common Market (ECCM) Agreement came into effect in June 1968, 
and to presume that envisioned customs union operations would 
he to heighten the effectiveness of the ECCM, From the stand-
point of the usually accepted definitions it is worth bearing 
in mind that in a common market the members proceed beijond the 
requirements of a customs union to eliminate restrictions among 
themselves on international movements of factors of production; 
while in an economic union members proceed beyond the require-
ments of a common market, to unify their fiscal, iuonetary 
and socio-economic policies. 
The exercise therefore would seem to be directed 
towards achieving the highest level of customs union type 
operations within the framework of the Eastern Caribbean 
Common "arket consistent with the particular circumstances in 
the OECo area. Close reference to the detailed provisions 
of the ECCM Agreement reveals that it contains many elements 
that their implementation would go much beyond purely customs 
union operations. Nevertheless the efficacy of those elements 
in large part depends on tie effectiveness of the customs 
union components. , 
f 
Accordingly, the structure adopted for this document 
starts by focussing on the provisions in the ECCM Agreement 
which are directly facilitative of customs union operations, 
(vi) 
In addition to identifying those pavtiaulax' features, the 
first section incorporates a short overview of their general 
application. 
The economic relationships of the OECS territories 
have the unique feature that white together they constitute 
a common market, they all also participate in the wider common 
market, Caricom, This ECCM-Caricom relationship is looked 
at in the second section,with concentration on hhe aspects 
that most closely affect the intra-OECS customs union relation-
ship. Inevitably several other aspecto of the ECCM-Caricom 
inter-relationship are not brought out in this text. 
The third section provides a review of the broad body 
of customs union concepts, to bring out the nature of such 
arrangements and the criteria that from time to time have 
been accepted as applying to them. This is supplemented by 
a summation of the effects that are generally attributed to 
customs union arrangements. 
The fourth section provides some comments on appli-
cability of usually accepted criteria in the circumstances of 
the OECS/ECCM area. Inevitably it also implies a preliminary 
conceptualisation of customs union operations in the par-
ticular circumstances of the OECS, with major attention 
being given to the movement of goods, which is the primary 
concern of customs unions. Regarding the latter, it is worth 
noting that the term customs union is developing a more 
generalised application, and is often used in reference to '' 
what may he deemed the next higher form of integration, the 
common market. This arises from the basic situation that 
such arrangements for the movement of goods are invariably 
related to encouraging economic factor movements. 
This paper does not deal with a series of related 
ongoing exercises at the level of Caricom. In this regard 
particular mention may be made of the harmonization of the 
ECCM cet and the Caricom cet; the new examination of Caricom's 
rules of origin; the newly introduced regime for agricultural 
products; and the various decisions in the Nassau Understanding 
that seek to modify sub-regional trade. The.equal treatment 
(v i i ) 
of the OECS territories within the CAricom framework in all ̂  
these matters, and teh common approach to the Caricom relation-
ship can for most practical purposes be left aside in considering 
the intra-OECS customs union relationship. 
Equally it should be noted that the circums tances 
in the OECS/ECCM combine features that go much beyond merely-: 
the movement of goods. The OECS territories already have in 
place some features like common currency, single Central Bank 
that are more usually' associated with economic union. These 
elements which are strongly facilitative of a deeper intra-
OECS customs union relationship ^ and encouraging for freer 
movement of the economic factors of production, are the sub-
ject of a separate study. The consideration of matters 
relating to allocation of industry, complementarity in pro-
duction lay beyond the immediate objectives of this paper 
where the focus is to consider some of the implications and 
options of deepening the customs union relationship within the 
OECS. 
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I - THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN COMMON MARKET (ECCM) FRAMEWORK 
1. In a Cuatomo Union, the primavy function io to create 
a regime for the movement of goods that is deemed to pe bene- i 
ficial to the participating countries. The standard approach 
is for the members to eliminate all tariffs among themselvea ̂  
and in addition to form a common tariff against all other 
countries with which there ia a trading relcitionohip. To 
achieve the former is a matter of adopting mubuallij advan'^ 
tageoua national legislative measures favouring the parlinevu; 
but to achieve the latter it is necessary for agreement to hú 
reached on a common tariff nomenclature or schedule^ and a 
set of identical tariff rates. 
Immediately a comparison can be made of these generally, 
accepted basic characteristics of a customs union, as against 
the provisions for them in the ECCM Agreement. ¡ 
ECCM Provisions 
2. The provisions in the ECCM Agreement concerning the 
movement of goods approximate to these two main criteria. 
From the outset the ECCM arrangements required the abolition 
of import duties on goods deemed to be eligible for tariff- , 
free treatment, consigned from one member territory to another. 
Parallel with this the^e was the decision to establish a 
common customs tariff on goods originating in non-member 
territories and countries. 
Intra-ECCM Trade: 
3. The stipulations regarding intra-ECCM trade defined 
import duties so as to include any tax or surtax of customs, 
and in addition any other charges of equivalent effect -
whether fiscal, monetary or exchange - which o.re levied on 
imports. Furthermore, the non-application of import duties 
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in intra-ECCM trade was emphasised by the specific indication 
that this would also be the case for goods produced in a 
partner country though not produced in the importing country, 
and that the treatment of such products would be on the basis 
of non-discrimination among partner sources as regards any 
internal charges that may apply. 
4. As regards the effect of internal taxation on goods 
imported from partners, the provision expressly forbade the 
application of any fiscal charges in excess of what applies 
to like domestically produced goods. Also, provision was ^ 
made that no charges should be so applied as to afford effective 
protection to like domestic goods, whether directly or 
indirectly. Additionally, members were forbidden to apply 
fiscal charges to goods imported from partners which the importing 
country does not itself produce, in such a way as to afford 
effective protection of the domestic production of substitute 
goods.^^ 
5. The provisions therefore sought to achieve the 
principles of: 
(i) easy movement of goods of area 
origin within the ECCM, free of trade 
duties and charges, whether applied 
directly or indirectly; 
• I • ' 
(ii) equality of treatment of parnters'' 
products on the same basis as that 
accorded to domestic products; 
(iii) access to the domestic markets of the •• 
member countries, of goods produced in 
partner countries, under conditions 
J where no protection is accorded to- • 
!' domestic producers of like goods or of 
substitues. 
1 : 1 ' 
i 
1 llM. 
i > ' ! 
- • i i 
Extra-ECCM Trade: 
6. In respect of trade with countries outside the ECCM 
area, article 7 of the ECCM Agreement provided for the 
establishment of a common customs tariff. 
¿/ ECCM Agreement Article 5 
y ECCm Agreement Article 8 
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No criteria was set in the Agreement for the method 
of determination of the common rates, how the common tariff 
should be brought into effect, or how it should be adminia tovod. 
It is therefore worthwhile to recall that at the time of ^ li 
. establishing the rates of duties for the ECCM common customs / ' 
tariff {CCD, although some difficulties arpse from the exis-
tence then of various preferential obligations, the prime > 
consideration was to set up a tariff in conformity with the j 
perceived economic developmental and financial intovoul of 
the territories in the ECCM group. ! i 
7. The ECCM participants were not 'bound' in the free , 
selection of duties for the common tariff, and theij coiild 
have made them higher if they so wished. However in the 
absence of a better system, the approach adopted was based 
on the arithmetical average of the then country rates, as I 
far as was logically justifiable. In the process practically ' i / ^ 
all raw materials and socially sensitive goods were made duty, îi i | j 
free; and for machinery and other production goods very little I;. 
(if any) duties were provided. In addition the transitional '' I 
arrangement was built into the common tariff that for some ¡ i 
items special (national) duties would be retained to be 
gradually adjusted towards a common rate. i j 
8. Aside from..the foregoing, the territories retained j; 
their individual treatment of extra-ECCM trade relations, ' . , ' 
{particularly in the application of charges having equivalent i i; 
\ effect to customs duties, and also in the regulation and ' ' j;i 
administration of trade. As a consequence there has not been ' ! 
uniformity throughout the ECCM area in such matters. i 
Application of the Provisions 
9. In implementing these provisions of the ECCM ' 
Agreement, import duties between the member states worc^. • ' i' 
deemed to be eliminated from the inception of the ECCM, •' 
and in 1972 the common external tariff came into effect. | ' 
In its first formulation the ECCM CET Was a two-column 
tariff with general and preferential rates{ but this was 
changed to a single column tariff in 1970 to conform with 
the changed situation which derived from the EEC/ACP relation-
ship that emerged under the Lome II Convention. Subsequently, j 
3/ The ECCM Agreement was signed at Grenada, 11 June 1968 
and came into force 11 July 1968. i 
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in 1979, the CET was updated to achieve a wider coverage of 
items. For a limited number of items\individual states 
retained the right to apply the Special Duty rates instead'of, 
the common ECCM rate. It was understood that this would be '•• ^ ' 
for some limited period; that the special rates would be 
altered from time to time in the directon of the common 
rates; and that progressively the number of items attracting 
special rates would be gradually reduced. 'It should however 
be noted that even at 1985 the ECCM CET is not yet applied 
by all the OECS territories. 
i . ' , I I 
10. Consistent with the application of a common external 
tariff,the OECS territories agreed on a common set of 
priciples for the interpretation of the tariff. These rules 
for interpretation are deemed to be an integral part of the 
tariff, and are set out in the notes that precede the rates 
of import duties. 
11. In addition, the common external tariff incorporates 
a list of Conditional Duty Exemptions and Reductions. This 
list contains the cases in which the governuuints participating 
in the ECCM may admit goods which are dutiable in lh& uutuoma 
tariff, either duty'-free or at a duty ratie lawai' than tha 
rates provided for in the common tariff. The goods granted 
such treatment need to be imported under the conditions 
specified in the list, which indicates the uses that would 
justify the special treatment. 
12. All decisions concerning the granting of these 
exemptions and reductions fall within the executive competence 
of the individual governments, who are free to refuse the 
exemptions should they so decide. An important qualification 
is that the OECS/ECCM countries should withhold those benefits 
from goods or articles which are obtainable at comparable 
cost from a manufacturer in the ECCM area. 
13. While the foregoing describes the general situation 
of extra-OECS trade from the standpoint of the ECCM provisions, 
account has to be taken that in treating the external trade 
of the OECS, trade with Caricom stands in a special relation-
ship. 
14. ^ All the OECS territories participating in the ECCM 
are in addition members of the Caribbean Community and Common 
r i i . i i'' .; 1 
i . i 
í, • 
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Market (Cavicom) which includes also Barbados, Belize,, Guyana^ 
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. Subject to similar area-
origin criteria under Caricom, trade with those countries 
are also carried out free from import duties within the 
terms of the Treaty of Chaguaramas. That Treaty however 
has exceptions applying to the DECS territories in its 
Schedules III and IV, whereby the rates of duty applied to 
the goods listed in the schedules are established by legis-
lation in each ECCM member state. 
15. In regard to the movement of goods the other Caricom 
countries therefore stand in a similar "custom union type" 
relationship to the DECS territores as the DECS do among them-
selves, but for the exceptions in favour of the OECS/ECCM 
countries under the CARICOM arrangements. practical 
purposes therefore OECS/ECCM trade may be considered as •, , 
being conducted at three levels identifiable as: intra-ECCH; 
ECCM-Caricom,and ECCM/rest of the world. 
16. To diverge briefly, if the volume of the global 
trade of the OECS territories is allocated according to these 
three categories what emerges is thatin a global trade of 
some EC$1,717 million in 1982, total intra-OECS trade was 
only EC$107m, just 6.2%. Contrasted to this, total trade 
of the OECS/ECCM territories with the other Caricom countries 
amounted to EC$341 million, or about 20% of OECS global trade; 
and total OECS/ECCM trade with the rest of the world was 
EC$ 1,269 million or 747o of their global trade. Within this 
over-all picture of OECS global trading, the total of OECS 
ynports was allocated: intra OECS/ECCM 4.2%; From other 
Caricom 15.3%; and from the rest of the world 80.5%. 
17. It immediately becomes apparent that the provisions 
under the ECCM Agreement applying to intra-ECCM trade related 
(in 1962) to under 5% of imports, while those affecting non-
Caricom trade related to some 80% of imports. Also it is 
evident that a neat diootomy between intra-ECCM trade and 
extra-ECCM trade is not strictly possible because of the 
special situation of ECCM-other Caricom trade, which accounts 
for over 15% of OECS imports. 
Charges having equivalent effect to customs duties: 
18. It is of significance that the ECCM provisions 
included the prohibition of all charges having equivalent 
4/ A fuller consideration of the OECS/ECCM-Caricom relation-
ship is pursued at Section II 
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effect to customs duties in respect of intra-ECCM trade. The 
reason for prohibiting such charges is that they have restrictivo 
effect on free movement of goods in just the same way ao custom i 
duties have. Similarly the reason for arriving at a desirable ; 
level of uniformity in the application of such charges in extra- j 
ECCM trade is to minimise the scope for trade diversions and : 
distortiond. i 
19. The best definition of the concept has been stated 
as...."any pecuniary charge imposed unilaterally^ however 
small and irrespective of its title and method of collection, 
which is levied on goods because they are crossing a border, 
constitutes a charge having equivalent effect to customs 
duty". Consistent with this, it should be borne in mind that 
a pecuniary charge forming part of a general system of internal 
taxation applied to national and imported goods on precisely 
the same termSf would not be treated as being a charge, having 
equivalent effect to that of a customs duty, 
20. It follows that not only is the restriotivo effool, on 
trade important, but also that the principle of non-'diocrimination 
in intra-ECCM trade in respect of domestic and non-domestic 
goods, (the principle of equal treatment), should he observed. 
In this context one needs to consider the range of special 
taxes chargeable on imports that supplement import duties in 
the OECS/ECCM territories 
i 
21. Review of the supplementary charges and taxes on 
imports reveals a wide range variously designated: stamp tax; 
stamp duty; package tax; excise duty; consumption tax; 
consumption duty; surtax on value; customs surcharges on 
certain goods categories; surcharge on consumption tax for 
selected items; purchase tax. As can be seen in Summary 
Table 1, not only is there variation as between the particular 
charge, tax or duty, adopted by each country, but there also 
is variation in the rate and application even where a par-
ticular type of charge, duty or tax is applied by several 
countries. 
22. Some of these charges, duties and taxes form part of 
the general system of internal taxation and are impartial 
between domestic and non-domestic ECCM goods - in particular, 
purchase taxes and consumption taxes which are normally levied 
5 / To the extent that such charges, taxes and other pecuniary 
impositions do not form part of a general system of internal 
taxation, they would be incompatible-, with customs union 
functioning. 
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for revenue earning purposes, rather than in implementation 
of a policy toward external trade. Some ather-s-however apply 
only to goods crossing th customs border, for example, package 
tax (most usually levied at a flat rate); stamp tax or duty 
(most usually ad valoreum on cif value); surtaxes on import 
value; and customs surcharges, 
23. It is of course necessary to examine the applicability 
and operation of each of ih^se charges, duties or taxes in 
detail before conclusions can be reached as to whether there 
would he a distortive effect on the common external tariff. 
Regulation and Administration of OECS/ECCM Trade: 
24. In addition to unification of the OECS/ECCM common 
external tariff and the question of charges which have equi-
valent effect to.cudtoms duties, there are a range of non-tariff 
elements that affect trade. In this regard it is not 
inappropriate to recall that within the terms of the Geheral 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the ECCM arrangements 
should so operate that substantially the same duties and other 
regulations of trade are applied by each of the participating 
countries. 
25. Given the wide acceptance of the GATT definition among 
trading nations it follows that in reviewing the operation of 
the ECCM, consideration should be given not just to the tariff 
framework but also to the range of non-tariff aspects affecting 
trade* 
26. At the level of general trade regulations, (i.e. in 
terms of prohibitions, licencing, permits and special 
certifico, tions), a substantial degree of uniformity has already 
: been achioved throughout the DECS area. For ease of reference 
and comparison the general import trading regulations of the 
seven OECS territories are brought together in Summary Table 2. 
i 
_ 27. The OECS territories maintain few prohibitions on \ 
'j imports. As would be noted from the Condensed: in formation in . 
ji'the summary table, the particular prohibitions range from i 
^ 'r.. general to specific. Most of the OECS territories maintain a ' 
I general prohibition against all imports from South Africa; ' 
and it would seem that there is no other such all-embracing 
f i ' 
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prohibition. In some cases there io a more limited general 
prohibition against the transmission of perishables through 
the general mail service. But for the remainder, such pro-
hibitions as operate are specific whether as to country or 
as to products. In one country there is a specific drug 
prohibition (hexachlorophene), as also of pyrotechnics producto; 
in another there is prohibition of imports of processed fruits 
and vegetables except from specified sources; and in one other 
country there is prohibition of bags, sacks, etc. previously 
containing cotton. There is only one case where prohibition 
has been explicitly stated in terms of goods competing with 
local products. 
26. >ls regards licensing requirements, the general practice 
in each of the OECS territories is thai most goods are imported 
under o >en general licence; but in each case this is suppl.e-, 
mented i.y a list of items that require individual licensing -
and the specific items on the lists vary from the one territory 
to the next. In addition there are specific licensing require-
ments for pesticides in two of the territories; and in 
another territory there is the requirement for licensing of] 
imports from centrally planned European and Asian countries.] 
Where specific licences are required, most of the territories 
have the provision that they are usually valid for six months;, 
but in any event the goods must arrive before the end of the 
calendar year. 
. I • • 
I 29. Similarly, there is a fair measure of uniformity as 
regards items of imports that require primor approval and permits. 
In every territory drugs and pharmaceuticals fall in this • j 
category; and in fact it is only in one territory that this 
particular requirement applies to other products - in that 
case "live animals meat and certain meat products", and "firearms 
ammunition and explosives". 
30. Generally, live animals, meats and some food products 
are tr^eate'd along uith plants and parts of plants, as requiring 
the imports to ¡be accompanied by certificates, primarily 
for satisfying health requirements. Beyond that some special 
certifications may be required depending on the nature of 
the goods. Sanitary certificates (e.g. certification of 
disinfection úiere there are importation of used clothing), 
phytosanitary certificates (for live plants), and veterianary 
; certificates are required in all the territories. In addition 
\ 
• I ' 
¡i ' ill 
1 • 
• I • ' • 
!¡ ' • , 
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at least one territory requires Jcreign meat inspection ' 
'.certificates for imports of frozen, chilled, salted or 
canned meats; and in another territory certificate of oricjin . 
is required for all processed fruit and vegetables. 
31. This very capsulated overview of the several sets .of 
general trade regulations is meant to show what ex'Vsts and 
also the variations as between the individual OECS territories. 
The latter consideration is important in the context that a 
customs union embracing all the OECS should ideally operate 
as a single customs territory, lb would therefore be immediately 
apparent that it would be eminently desirable to have the 
maximum obtainable uniformity of trade regulatory devices, to 
the extent that overall objective of fuller customs union 
operations is pursued. 
I • I 
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II - THE ECCM - CAR I COM INTKR-RELM'IONSllIV 
32. An important element in considering OECS/ECCM customs 
union operations y is that the ECCM arrangements are embraced 
within the wider activities of the Caribbean Community and 
Common Market (Caricom), It Would therefore not be inappro-
priate to consider the situation in terms of a customs union 
within a wider customs union. The differentiations between 
ECCM and Caricom then become important. 
33 The manner in which this evolved was that the 
Caribbean Free Trade Association (Carifta) came into effect 
1 May 196 8 with four members ~ Antigua, Barbados, Guyana and 
Trinidad and Tobago. The other countries (excluding Montserrat) 
which presently constitutes the OECS acceded to Carifta 
1 July 1968. Jamaica and Montserrat acceded to Carifta 
1 Augui- 1968. Parallel with the establishment of Carifta, 
the now OECS countries (then the l/est Indies Associated States) 
negotiated the East Caribbean Common Market (ECCM) Agreement 
which was signed on 11 June 1968 and came into effect 
15 July 1968. 
34. The primary consideration in formulating the ECCM 
Agreement was to devise a mechanism enabling its participants 
to take fullest advantage of the concessions available to 
them under the Carifta arrangcmetns. The strategy was to 
advance the process of integration among themselves beyond 
what was stipulated in Carifta. The East Caribbean Common 
Market (ECCM) would operate within the wider free trade zone 
with the ECCM territories acting jointlyFor this purpose 
there was to be a higher level of coordination and harmonisation 
among the ECCM countries in the main fields of economic policy 
and implementation. 
35. The Carifta Agreement was superseded by the Treaty 
establishing the Caribbean Community - 4 July 1973, which 
raised the status of Carifta to Common Market (Caricom). 
Ij This explains why various provisions identical to those 
in the Carifta Agreement were included, and still appear, 
in the ECCM Agreement. 
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To the Carifta arrangements were added provisions for a common 
external tariff and common protective policy, havmonioation of 
incentives to industry, and various elemento of functional 
co-operation that could permit extending the scope of the 
integration arrangemetns. 
36. The evolution of Carifta into Caribbean Community 
and Com:¡'on Market had two significant elements for the OECG/KCCM: 
first, several measures not dissimilar to the ECCM initiatives 
began to be introduced at the Caricom level; and secondly, 
the special concessions that had been provided in Carif!:a for 
the ECCM territories were elaborated into a Special Regime for 
the LDC's of Caricom. 
'67. In the meantime there were not any subi:>tantial amend-
ments to the integrative provisions of the ECCM Agreement. It 
seems reasonable to accept that the rationale for establishing 
the ECCM within Carifta is no less valid in respect of Caricom, 
taking account that the formal integration provisions in the 
ECCM Agreement remain deever than those of Caricom. For the 
purposes cf this paper, the significant consideration is that 
a range of Caricom requirements apply throughout the ECCM area; 
and the implementation of decisions taken at the Caricom level 
which are agreed for the OECS countries are administered 
simultaneousln with decisions taken under the ECCM umbrella. 
37a. Given the background to the evolution of the ECCM and 
Caricom respectively, it is of some importance that the Caricom 
Treaty Annex contains a provision at Article 67 which gives 
express recognition to the ECCM. This is stated in the terms: 
"Nothing in this Annex shall effect any decisions 
or things done under the East Caribbean Common 
Market Agreement immediately before the coming 
into force of this Annex or the continued application 
and development of that Agreement to the extent 
that the objectives of that Agreement are not achieved 
in the application of the objectives of this Annex~ 
provided such application or development does not 
conflict with obligations under this Annex of the 
Member States which are parties to that Agreement". 
In applying the transitional and other special arrange-
ments in Caricom favouring the ECCM territories (Caricom 
LDC sJ Caricom decisions frequently contain elements meant 
to meet their particular circumstances. 
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Tariff Provisions and Origin Rules 
'¿0. The respective pi-ovioions governing the operation of 
the ECCM and Caricom both include provisions prohibiting the 
application of import duties, taxes, surtaxes or any other 
charges having equivalent effect to customs entries, to goods 
originating within the common markets. They both also have 
the proviso that this treatment does not extend to the 
imposition of non-discriminatory internal charges. In 
addition they both have origin criteria that must be met if 
goods are to receive ECCM area treatment, and Caricom area 
treatment, respectively. Beyond these similarities, there are 
particular provisions in Caricom that apply to the OECS/ECCM 
countries under Caricom's special regime of the Less Developed 
Countries, including a situation in which the OECS/ECCM countries 
may retain customs duties on goods from the Caricom MDC's. 
The specifics of the two sets of provisions, and the de facto 
situation arising from their simultaneous application, results 
in a somewhat complex set of relationships. 
39. A central consideration is that the ECCM common external 
tariff (CET) stands side by side with the Caricom common 
external tariff. Both CET's being based on the Customs 
Cooperation Council Nomenclature (CCCN) results in a high degree 
of coincidence of tariff heading numbers and the related 
description of goods. There are however differences in the 
levels of disaggregation of the tariff heading, in some cases 
resulting in a tariff number applying to one set of goods in , 
the ECCM CET but a different set of goods in the Caricom CET.-' 
Further, it 'has to be noted that for many products the rate 
that applies in the ECCM CET .is different from the rate that 
applies in the Caricom CET.— On the whole the general level 
of tariff of the ECCM CET is lower than that of the Caricom CET. 
40. Also of significance are the .juridical differences in 
the conditions for ECCM area treatment and Caricom area treat-
ment. The latter apply to goods entering ECCM countries from 
non-ECCM-Cáricom countries. Goods moving within the ECCM area, 
to be eligible for ECCM area treatment should conform to one 
of ths following conditions: 
To give an example: 
in CAricom 49.11.1 - Unframed photographs, maps, charts 
diagrams. 
In ECCM 49.11.1 - Trade advertising material, commercial 
catalogues and the like. 
Example: 06.03 - Cut flowers and flower buds eta. 
CAricom CET 45%; ECCM CET 25% 
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(a) be wholly produced within the ECCM 
area; 
(b) fall within a description of goods 
listed in a "process list"; 
(c) contain materials imported from out-
side the ECCM area that do not exceed 
a stipulated percentage of the export 
price. 
In addition these "origin rules" provide that the seventy-
three items which constitute the Basic Materials List (attached 
as Sd.idule to Annex A of the ECCM Agreement) would be regarded 
as orginating wholly withn the Eastern Caribbean Common Market. 
Regarding (b) it must be remarked that there is not an ECCM 
process list. 
41. The origin provisions and qualifications in the Caricom 
context are different in that goods to be treated as being 
of Caricom origin must be either: 
wholly produced within the 
Caricom region 
or - produced within Caricom, wholly or 
partly from materials imported from 
outside Caricom, by a process which 
effects a substantial transformation. 
The characteristics of "substantial transformation" are 
spelled out variously as: 
(a) tariff heading classification of the 
commodity different from the classifi-
cation of the materials; 
or (b) conforming to a particular prescribed 
process; 
or (c) meeting the criteria that the value of 
extra-regional materials used does not 
-19-
exceed a stipulated pevcentage of , 
export price of the finished product. 
42. The Caricom rules of origin, however., sets out ike 
list of conditions that are to be compiled with the MDC's^. 
and the LDC's reepeotively, for a wida range of produato."^ 
In some cases where the LDC's ave permitted the value of 
úsatra-Tegional materiate used not to exceed 807o, the MDC'e 
are timibed to d3% in othov eaaaa whex>@ the I,DC o etpis per-
mitted 60% of extra-regional materials, the MÜC's must make a 
tariff jump. Where a time qualification applies (e.g. 2 years 
after entry into operation of the new origin system) the LDC's 
are in the majority of oases given a longer^ period - 4 years. 
43. It is far from clear whether or not OECS customs 
officials apply any general distinction in the treatment of 
imports, as between ECCM goods and non-ECCM-Caricom goods, to 
satisfy the ECCM origin rules as distinct from the Caricom 
origin rules. The evidence suggests that at the de facto 
level of day-to-day operations the Caricom rules of origin 
are applied in respect of both ECCM goods and non-ECCM-Caricom 
goods. • To a large extent this seems to be attributable to 
two factors - first, the absence of an ECCM Process List, and 
second the availability of Caricom rules for manufactures 
from within the LDC's, Therefore by default the Caricom 
origin rules come to he applied in intra-ECCM trade. The con-
census seems to be that no real harm is done because (a) almost 
all of ECCM trade is liberalised anyway, and (b) the level 
of trade in manufactures is not very great. 
44. A related element that bears noting, is that whereas 
different customs documents/forins were used depending on 
whether imported goods originate from within the ECCM or from 
non-ECCM-Caricom countries, this practice has virtually ceased 
and Caricom documents are used. This again is by default. 
45. The point was made earlier that decisions taken 
within the ECCM frame are implemented simultaneously with 
decisions taken at the Caricom level (to the extent that the 
latter apply to the OECS territories). A good recent example 
is the range of tariff revisions that were embraced in the 
Nassau Understanding, Included in that package, were decisions 
to increase the rates of customs duty on an agreed list of 
items. Subsequent translation of that list of items into 
5 / Article 14 and Schedule II of the Annex to the Treaty 
establishing the Caribbean Community. 
6/ Schedule II of the Annex to the Treaty establishing the 
Caribbean Community and Common Market. 
© 
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tariff headings had the consequential effects for the . 
ECCM CET of introducing a measure of disaggregation^ in some ;; 
categories in addition to changing the rates of duty. Similarly ̂  
it is of importance to note that decisions at Caricom level 
do on occasion have the effect of stimulating amendment in 
the ECCM Agreement. Annex II to the ECCM Agreement adopted 
in 1975^ was consequential on change in the value-added 
qualification for Caricom'LDC s, from 50% to 60%. 
Some Further Considerations 
46. Concerning other aspects that affect the movement 
of goodst both the ECCM and Caricom texts have similar pro-
visions concerning Revenue Duties and Internal Taxation^ in 
both cases the objeotive being to achieve non-discriminatory 
treatment as between imports (eligible for the respective 
area market tariff treatment), and similar goods and sub-
stitutes in domestic production. In the previous section of 
the paper attention was drawn to the importance of eliminating 
any discriminatory effects that may derive from "other charges 
having equivalent effect to customs duties" within the context 
of OECS customs union operations. That observation is no 
less valid in the wider context of Caricom, as between the 
total membership of Caricom, and as regards the ECCM/Caricom 
inter-relationship. 
47. In a similar context the non-tariff mechanisms for 
the regulation and administration of trade ought also to 
he nori'dieoriminatopif in their opevatioriy ae between the 
total memhevQhip of CaHaom^ and as regards the ECCM/Cariaom 
inter-relationship. At the Caricom level these mechanisms 
are more divoras and oophietieated than at tha ECCM levml. 
While no attempt is made here to provide a coverage for 
Caricom as was done for the ECCM, it can be observed that 
the evidence suggests they are impartial in their operation 
as between the OECS countries and the non-OECS-Caricom countries. 
48. As regards the treatment of exports within the two 
common markets, they both leave open the right of participating 
member) to refuse as eligible for area treatment goods that 
enjoy subsidy in the exporting partner country (i.e. export 
draw-back). In addition they both contain identically worded 
provisions in respect of dumped and subsidised imports. 
' i 
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I • I ; ,,: ' . I ; 
Taking all this together, the rules of competition appear to 
be essentially the same except for the concessions in Caricorn 
that apply to the ECCM territories (for example those of 
Caricorn Annex Schedules III and IV), , 
49. However, it might also be noted that the Caricorn text 
expressly prohibits the application of export duties, and 
provides for freedom of transit - elements which do not appear 
in the ECCM text, and which in their applications become in 
effect extensions of the ECCM provisions, In a similar 
manner the specific provisions in Cdricom permitting the 
temporary application of quantitative restrictions. as a result 
of balance of payments difficulties could legally be applied 
on goods of area origin by OECS countries by virtue of their 
membership in Caricorn although there is not a similar pro-
vision in the ECCM Agreement, 
50. Such aspects bring into focus the decision-making 
processes behind the ECCM/Caricom inter-relationship ^ within 
the OECS. The general pattern is for measures introduced at 
the Cavicom level to he reviewed by the OECS Secretariat and 
withi: the.^OECS Economía Affairs Committee to determine the . 
ooneeiioud that th® group ehauld pursue within the Cariaom 
Counait, By this means -¿he 0/i'CS group (as Caricorn LDC'e) 
invariably manages to have decisions at Caricorn reflect con-
cessions that are deemed necessary to their' unique circum-
stances. Such concessions are seen as being within the frame-
work of Caricorn's Special Regime for the Less Developed Countries 
51. An .important aspect that has bo be borne in mind, is 
that the mutual rights and obligations of the OECS countries 
as among themselves is defined by the ECCM text: while the 
Caricom text defines these matters as between an OECS country 
and a non-OECS-Caricom country. However, the application of 
Caricom provisions (that are outside the ECCM) among'the OECS 
States brings into play a juridical relationship between OECS 
countvi>es that derive from their participation in Caricom. 
Transition and Harmonisation 
52. Within Caricom,the OECS group benefit from two types 
of concessions - those that are transitional as for 
example the items of Caricom Schedules III, and others that 
, ! • 
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íi 
are "permanentbeing essentially differential treatment 
favouring the LDC'a^ which are reviewed from time to time. 
For t'. e purposes of this paper there is not really a need 
to analyse the second group of concessions; and among the 
first group (the transitional concessions} the most important 
is that relating to the common external tariff. 
53. The provisions for establishing the Caricom common 
external tariff allowed for the ECCM CET to be seen.as 
fulfilling the initial obligations of the DECS countries ; i i . 
in this respect.—' But it also provided that this situation ' i 
would be kept under review^ in the light of the prevailing 
economic situation of the LDC's to determine an appropriate 
phasing for arriving at a single common external tariff 
covering the whole Caricom area. By this means the ECCM ; 
common tariff was left to operate parallel with the Caricom | 
common external tariff pending their harmonisation. 8^/ In 
; practice there is a measure of overlap of the Caricom rates ' ]; 
and the ECCM rates so that in fact for about 45% of the items ' . ; 
in the tariff the rates are identical. For the rest there is 'i 
a differential between the CAricom rates and the ECCM ratest 
the latter being the lower in most cases. 
54. The situation is much less ohrar-cut in other 
aspects of common protective policy. Both the agreements 
leave participants free to act independently in respect of ; 
third country trading partners. In the case of the ECCM • 
this would be conducted within the framework of harmoni- , 
zation of development, investment and industrial policies, 
and also uniform treatment of non-resident capital within ? 
the framework of common monetary policy. The Caricom under- . 
takings are that member states would pur-sue such policies 
(including quantitative restrictions) on imports from third 
countries, as would facilitate the implementation of a common 
protective policy as soon as practicable; and further, 
there should be a seeking for progressive co-ordination in 
trade relations with third countries or groups of third 
countries. i ' | • 
55. While the conditions for liberalizing the movement 
of goods is generally the same in both the ECCM and Cdricom, 
£/ The process as originally envisaged would have ccmn.enced 
~ August 197?t and concluded Auguet 1981, 
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there are substantial differences between the two as regards 
facilitating the movement of production factors. For example 
where ECCM contains the prooiaion bhak "mrmltnr 
terribories shall on the coming into force of bhin AgreamanL 
immediately abolish as between themselves res t ri c t ions on I-he 
movement of capital belonging to persons resident ihereui. 
Current payments connected with the movements of such capital 
between member territories shall not be subject to any 
restrictions"^.^ in Caricom there in only a comnii tmn ii t 
to " examine ways and means for the regulated movement 
of capital within the common market." ]Jl/ 
56. Similarly ̂  where the ECCM provides that steps taken 
by member territories to free the movement of persona 
should be kept under review and evaluated, and that 
"proposals for the phased removal of obstacles to the freedom 
of movement of persons within the(ECCM) common market" 
should be submitted^ Caricom has only a saving provision in 
respect of movement of persons in Caricom.In fact, the 
Principles of the ECCM Agreement explicitly states that the 
ECCM activities shall include the abolition as between member 
territories of the obstacles to the free movement of persons, 
services and capital. 
57. The immediate implications of intended easier move-
ments of production factors, within the ECCM area is that 
there is greater possibility for benefitting from comparative 
advantages where they exist. Of course the extent to which 
this is realised depends on the process of implementation. 
It is however of much importance that the ECCM operations are 
meant to work in the area of production to a greater extent 
than are those of the Caricom. For the present it is the 
measures for harmonisation of fiscal incentives to industry 
that is of importance in the ECCM/Caricom relationship, in 
particular the differential that is granted to the LDC's as 
against the MDC's in Caricom. 
1/ DECS Treaty Annex Article 12 
10/ Caricom Treaty Annex Article 3 
11/ Cari-com Annex ARticle 38 "Nothing in this Treaty 
should be construed as requiring or imposing any obligation 
on a Member State to grant freedom of movement into its 
territory whether or not such persons are nationals of 
other Member States". 
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III - OVEItVIEW OF CUSTOMS UNION CONCEPTS 
Th e I! a a i c Prop oot i o no 
58. The es tabliahment of Cuotomo Uniono (and oUiev apecLal 
tariff . "vangements) between politically independent a Lateo 
are often oeen as at leaot a partial aolution to mamj of the 
economic and political problems encountered in international 
relationahips. The usual line of argumentation ia tlud a 
Customs Union creates a wider trading area, removes ob:j tw: I or. 
to competition among the participants, makes possible a more 
'Economic allocation of resources, and thus operates to iiicredr.c 
product i on and raise planes of living. In addi tion, Cuvtoun: 
Unions are considered to be conducive to the expansion of trade 
on a basis of multilateralism and non-discrimination among 
partners. 
It is on the basis of such argumentation that some timer, 
the purpose of a customs union has been stated as essentially 
to permit (by virtue of a more extensive economic territory) 
a more developed division of labour better adapted to tJie 
existing natural and economic conditions, and consequently 
the potential to yield a more abundant and lower-cos t pro-
duction destined for the combined market. If this is so, then 
it may be expected that what would evolve is a greater degree 
of apecialÍBation, either because each country extends its 
production of those commodities for which it io better suited, 
or because within the same category of products the countries 
agree to specialise on specified types. 
6Ü, The generalisation that the larger economia area of a 
customs union is conducive to increasing the potential a>id 
scope for internal division of labour has also been linked 
with the view that customs union initiatives are movements to 
promote change in the international division of labour. 
61. Butthere also is theotherview of customs unions as 
mechanisms for making higher protection feasible and effective 
for limited areas going beyond the boundaries of asingle state, 
and promoting greater self-sufficiency for the larger area 
because self-sufficiency for single states Was clearLy impracti-
cable or too costly. (It would of course, also follow that under 
1/ It should be noted that where this is an objective, the 
lower the rates of duty in the customs tariff, the less 
effect of this kind the customs union would have. 
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cuatoms union there would be a decrease in the degree of self-
oufficiencij of each member^ to the extent that specialisation 
develops t although there is an increase in the degree of oelf-
suffioiency of the customs union area as a whole), 
62. While each of these propositons would be true in some 
measure they do not apply equally to different customs unions. 
For this reason it is desirable and necessary to examine the 
particular circumstances before arriving at judgements and 
conclusions. 
Nature and Criteria 
if 2. The general view postulates that a cus toma union ahoiild 
meet three basic oondilona i 
(a) complete elimination of tariffs aa hetioaan 
the member territories; 
(b) establishment of a uniform tariff on 
imports from outside the union; 
Cc) apportionment of customs revenue between 
the members in accordance with an agreed 
formula. 
G4. From time to time further criteria have been stipulated 
in customs unions negotiations such as: 
(d) foreign goods requiring only one and the 
same customs declaration; 
(e) all goods entering from outside the union 
being subject to the same customs regulations; 
(f) goods imported into the union paying only 
once the rates fixed by the tariff common 
to the countries forming the union. 
65. International law does not establish any definition of 
a complete customs union aside from what is stipulated in the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATTj.i/ There is stated 
that - "For the purpose of this Agreement: 
2/ See Article IXIV paragraph 8(a) 
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(a) A customs union shall be understood to mean 
the substitution of a aingle cuotoins torri" 
torif for two or more oustoms l^erplpories o o 
that 
• (i) duties and other res triotiüe 
regulations of commerce (except, 
where necessary, those permitted 
under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, 
XV and XXX) are eliminated with 
respect to substantially all the 
trade between the constituent 
territories of the union or at 
least with respect to substantially 
all the trade in products originating 
in such territories, and 
(ii) subject to the provisions of para-
graph 9 substantially the same duties 
and other regulations of commerce 
are applied by each of the members of 
the union to the trade of territories 
not included in the union". 
What has become accepted in practice as constituting 
the format for customs union operations centre around this range 
of characteristics; but there have been variations depending 
on particular concessions that the involved countries are 
prepared to make. 
^^• Historically, customs unions that have been established 
reflect the features of having; free exchange of the products 
of the participating countries; uniformity of the external 
import tariffs of the participating countries and supression 
of intra-union tariffs; pooling of oustoms revenues and their 
apport onment between the participating countries in accordance 
with a formula established in advance. However, there also 
have been cases where provision is made for the removal of 
tariffs between members, and adoption of a common tariff against 
imports from the outside ~ but leave intact (except as sub-
sequently altered by mutual agreement) the whole machinery of 
import limitations, import licences, special exemptions and 
administrative and regulatory mechanisms. 
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Tariffs 
63. Provisions for (a) elimination of tariffs internal to 
the union, and (b) the 0Qt«hHBht>i@ntt &f « aamitiOH &»bat>nal tariff 
on imports from outeidd the union, are in their way the two 
p 'imary features of customs unions. It is by effectively 
combining these two actions that definition is given to the 
new wider area embracing the participating countries. While 
the former is on the whole usually straight-forward, taking 
account that the states are contiguous, to effect the latter 
tends to be more difficult. 
69. Decisions in favour of customs unions often have a 
proviso that the common tariff should not be "higher" than 
the tariffs of the member countries prior to the union. In 
fact this provision in the GATT is stated in the terms that 
the duties and other regulations on trade "shall not on the 
whole be higher or more restrictive than the general incidence 
of the luties and regulations of trade applicable in the con-
stitueti' territories prior to the formation of such union".^J 
To satisfy this requirement a commonly used approach is to 
average the national rates for each commodity group, so that 
some partners move up and others move down to arrive at the 
common rate. 
70. It might, however, be immediately observed that even 
if the new tariff is made up of the lowest rates previously 
levied by any of the member countries on each class of imports, 
the common tariff may still be more restrictive in fact, than 
the previous tariffs, because customs unions operate to con-
vert revenue duties to protective duties. For this reason, 
it is often assumed that in a customs union the purpose of 
the tariffs is protection, not revenue; and that either a 
tariff will be high enough to bring domestic production into 
being, or it will not be imposed at all. 
71. This in turn opens up the question of whether, or to 
what extent the customs tariffs of the individual countries 
were primarily of a protective nature or were mainly for revenue 
earning purposes. Such consideration of course affects phe 
level of the common external tariff for the various classes 
of goods that would emerge from negotiations. 
3/ See Artiolo XXIV 6(a) 
-28-
It is not easy to diotinguish sharply between revenue duties 
and proteo tive duties. On i he one hand, protec tiva duties 
are th< r,e which operate to reduce importo, not only by tnakiny 
commodi ies of the specific kind inooloed more expansive to 
potential customers (and so lessening their consumption) but 
also, and chiefly by diverting consumption from imported 
commodities to the products of corresponding domestic industries. 
7 2. On the other hand, revenue duties may be regarded as 
those duties productive of revenue whi^ do not act as 
effective stimulus to the domestic production of commodities 
similar to those paying the duties. Even such duties, however, 
operate to increase the proportion of aggregate domestic 
consumption which is directed towards domestically produced 
commodities. 
7Z. The substantial difference then between revenue duties 
and protective duties is that revenue duties have only a 
generalised protective effect, whereas protective duties have 
both this generalised effect and a special effect in stimulating 
the domestic production of commodities similar to those subject 
to the protective duty, (with the consequence that protective 
duties tend to be more effective than revenue duties as restraints 
on importation). 
Apportioninent of Cus toma Revenuea 
7 2a. As regapds (o)appovtioninent of ouatoiiia íujVühuú baiwuon I ha 
ttiembars, whaneoex' ouatomo rov^nuoa ava vary importan t, thu 
method of their allocation between the mambora of a autitomu 
union is likely to be a major issue. Generally, the greater 
the disparity in economic levels between the members, and 
the greater the differences as between the members in the 
normal consumption of imported commodities, the greater is 
likely to he the difficulty in finding a formula for allocation 
of customs receipts, which can be mutually acceptable. 
74. Different approaches have been adopted in the past 
but none have been without problems. In the Zollverein,* the 
simplest possible formula of allocation, which is, allocation 
according to population, was found to be generally practicable; 
but modification was necessary in at least two instances - in 
respect of members with relatively high per capita income levels 
Customs union of the German states in the nineteenth century. 
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and in reapect of members with opeoially important external 
trade relations. 
75. In Customs unions in which British Coloniea have 
participated, (as welt as in some other customs unions), 
allocation was in general according to the place of con-
sumption of the dutiable goods. However, this formula, could 
be difficult to apply either where imported raw materials 
are processed in one member territory for sale in another, 
or where wholesale distribution was concentrated in one 
territory. 
Although allocation according to consumption has been 
the more favoured approach, customs unions that embrace con-
tiguous countries still found it neceosavy to allocate a 
fraction of the receipts ae compensation for administrativa 
expenses to the territory or territories in which the import, 
duties were actually collected. In some cases agreed percentages 
were applied, and in others lump sum per annum allocations 
were made. 
• The crux of the problem, however, is that when a common 
tariff is in operation,the question of transfer of customs 
receipts will arise mainly in the case where an importer enters 
goods for customs which will subsequently be sent on to another 
territory within the union. This is more so the case where 
the union countries are contiguous and customs boundaries 
between them are eliminated and also customs services. 
Single treatment of Imports 
78, The features (d) (e) and (f) - respectively, (foreign 
goods requiring only one and the same customs declaration; 
all goods entering from outside the union being subject to 
the same customs regulations; goods imported into the union 
paying only once the rates fixed by the tariff common to the 
countries forming the union) - are often subsummed within the 
provisions for uniform treatment of imports. Where the 
countries are contiguous and customs frontiers between them 
are removed, the logic of the situation would lead to their 
implementation. However the implementation gives rise to a 
range of customs administration considerations, not the 
least of which are ensuring comparable efficiency in the 
* Cui ron¡8 union of the German states in the nineteenth 
century. 
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several countries of entry, and the locus of authoi'ity in 
matters of adminiateving the customs laü and regulation!}. 
Customs Adininiatration 
79. To satisfy the criteria for uniform treatment of 
imports and in particular the features (d) (e) and (f)t it 
has been found desirable in some cases to merge in some 
degree or fashion the customs administration staffs of thé 
participating countries. This comes not only from seeking 
greater administrative economies ̂  but also from the fact 
that when the tariff v)all is removed between countries ̂  each 
is likely to acquire a^- active concern in the character and 
standards of customs administration in the other member 
countries. If the countries are of comparable importance, 
this concern is greater depending on the extent of their 
differing economic interests and conditions, and differences 
in loyalties (as between sectors) in each territory. 
Several degrees of merger of customs services have 
been distinguished: 
(1) Complete absorption by a dominant 
member of the responsibility for 
enforcement of customs laus 
and regulations. 
(2) A merged central customs and administrative 
staff responsible to. the customs union 
as a whole (and not to particular members J; 
(3J Active participation by officers of 
more efficient members in the administration 
of the customs of other members; 
(4) Mutual supervision; 
(5) Complete autonomy of administration with 
reliance upon mutual integrity and 
submission to arbitration in case of 
disputes. 
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BO. One consequential aspect of merged adminisbvation 
is that the greater the extent of unification in the cKntouuj 
atiroiceo, the wore important become» the (¡uontion of execution 
control of the cuatonio administration, and the manner in uUiit'Ji 
such authority is allocated. 
Allocation of Authority 
SI' Beyond the day-to-day administration of customs, thorc 
are im >ortant aspects concerning the manner in which to effect 
changer, in tariffs, changes in customs codes, and the conduct 
of negotiations with outside countries on tariff matters. It 
is with regard to these aspects that questions of allocation 
of authority arise, for which there are a range of possible 
alternatives. 
\ ' ' 
There is the possibility of the countries participating 
in the union adopting terms of equality in tariff legislation 
and administration. By these arrangements changes in the tariff 
could be made only by mutual consent, with customs adminis tration 
remaining in the charge of the individual countries, subject 
only to an agreed common administrative code. In such a situation, 
policy is decided by standard diplomatic procedures, ail the ¡ 
members having equal status, and unanimity is required to 
institute tariff or administrative changes, and to negotiate 
effectively with non-member states. ' 
There is also the possibility of the sovereign states 
comprising the customs union establishing a Customs Council 
which reaches decisions binding on all by majority vote. In 
this situation customs inspectors, instead oj oetng local civil 
servants, become officers ansoerable to the Council. And 
through the Council negotiations are conducted with third 
countries, and oommerioal treaties concluded. This latter aspect 
is in some cases circumscribed where individual members are 
anxious to ensure for themselves greater freedom of action in 
negotiating commercial treaties with third countries. 
Between those two alternatives is the possibility where 
the customs laws and administration are "assimilated", with 
permanent conference^ established to supervise the application 
of the tariff and of the customs regulations. This approach 
which is looser and more cumbersome than Oie Customs Council 
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retains direct participation in decision-making particularly \ i ' ' M ' 
in the crucial areas of: ,, , ' i 
(a) harmony of relations as against third 
countries; 
. . . • ! , ; ^ 
(b) ' procedures for tariff revision; • i 
! (c) allocation of revenues from import duties ' 
i collected in one country on goods destined i 
for a partner. 
Inhibiting Factors 
85. Whether or to what extent intended objectives are realised 
depends on a range of ciraumstances, some of whioh could inhibit 
the cusiomee union operation. For exampló^ a eignifioant eoonomio 
consequence of a customs union is to make a country's territory 
an additional field of operation forthe tariff protection of 
its partners' industries. This assumes some specific actions 
for effectively opening the internal market in each country to 
the goods from partner countries, and could expose local products 
to competition from lower cost industries in partner countries. 
But if there is aversion to opening of markets to the competition 
of each other's industries^ there will not be progress toward 
specialisation^ division of labour and such derived economies 
as may have been envisaged, 
86. Perhaps an even more central factor is the extent to I 
which the yield from taxes on trade constitutes a high proportion 
of total revenue. If a customs union is established between 
countries which before had only revenue duties^ and if all the 
duties levied by the customs union continue to operate mainly 
as "revenue duties"y an appraisal of the customs union would 
turn cheifly on its administrative economies, or conveniences ̂  
or on political aspects. 
87. There are situations where economic factors are not on 
the whole such as to make specially close commercial ties between 
neighbouring countries genuinely attractive. They may be typically 
rival exporters of the same staple commodities; and also they 
may be poor sources of supply for the goods in most urgent demand 
from abroad. Further^ the existence of price controls, subsidies, 
etc., make it extremely difficult if not impossible to completely 
remove trade barriers, unless the process is carried beyond the 
customs union stage. In addition^ where there is heavy dependence 
on indirect taxation as a source for government revenue, a good • ¡ 
deal of the possible administrative economy of customs union 
is likely to be lost, if the establishment of some uniformity 
in such taxes did not accompany formation of the customs union. 
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88. In some oases, there is not the possibility to create a 
full customs union^ because it would involve the establishment 
of opeaial institutions to perform functions that individual 
mxsmber countries do not have the capacity to undertake on a con-
tinuing hasis. Invariably this involves not only an additional 
money-cost but also the surrender of some sovereignity in 
legislative matters, which the countries may not be willing to 
concede. 
89. It is against the background of this range of concepts 
that the OECS/ECCM customs union possibilities are considered 
in the fourth section of this paper. 
Effects (Gains, Looses) 
90. There are in essence two approaches to assessing the 
effects of customs unions, and the treatment varies depending 
upon the assumption that is made as to the nature of the 
political process. The first approach assumes governmental 
activities to be "non-economic" and focuses on the economic 
costs of such activity, which when compared to the non-economic 
benefit determines whether or not the customs union on balance 
is beneficial. The second approach assumes that government 
activity is directed towards maximising economic welfare and 
formation of the customs union as a means to develop optimisation 
procedures in support of overall government objectives. 
91. Traditionally the first approach was taken as the 
point of departure, and the analyses concentrated on trying to 
identify the gains and the losses attributable to customs union, 
separating those which enhance from those which lower the total 
of social welfare.^-' But more recently the orientation has 
been towards the more fundamental question of why customs 
unions are formed. Such change reflects both a theoretical 
and an institutional imperative. The former being the failure 
of traditional trade theory to explain why policies other than i, 
free tiade or modified free trade are followed by government's; 
the latter due to the interest of developing countries in economic 
integration as a means of accelerating their rate of economic 
progress. 
' • l i- ' ' i 'r 
92. For small developing countries entering customs unions, . 
the economic considerations as a rule are regarded as attractive i 
• • ' ' • ' I I ' ' ' i 
H This was based on the implicit assumption that "real . 
Income" is identifiable on social welfare function lines i 
with the utility derived by individuals from their personal 
CO nsumption of goods and services. ' 
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and to the extent that there is an economic case for such 
specially close economic ties between the countries, the case 
is likely to be stronger where it rests on specific economic 
criteria. But in practice the ¿ssence of the relationship goas\ 
beyond purely economic oonsiderationB to embrace other aspects 
of policy. As a coneequence ouototnB union analyoie haa come to ̂  
h& b&aad on aún&pianúe of the idea that it is a deliberate use of 
tariff policy by two or mora countries to aohiev& objaohivieo 
not attainable through indioidual action. And relatad bo 
this is the further idea that the customs union approach is 
attractive to countries that individually are unable to affect 
their terms of trade^ although they are able to trade at the 
foreign rate of product transformation, 
93. Such considerations focus tariff policy in customs 
unions as essentially protective mechanisms, which, by the 
elimination of tariffs within the union along with the main-
tenance of tariffs against countries outside the union, enable 
the partners in the union to develop as sources of supply, 
thereby replacing some imports from countries outside the ' 
union. 
Trade Effects 
Because of the central place tariffs in customs\ union 
arrangements and the effects that tariffs have on trade, analyses 
of the operations of customs unions invariably stress the 
trade aspects. The general approach is in terms of separating 
these effects as to whether they are "trade creating" or "trade 
diverting". In the first category are put the accretions 
to trade among the partners, and in the second the extent 
to which the union has resulted in substituting supplies from 
inside the union for imports from outside the union. In practice 
the net trade result is a combination of these two effects. 
According to the traditional view, if the trade creation is 
the greater element there is an addition to social welfare; 
and if the trade diversion is the greater there is a reduction 
in social welfare.^./ 
35. Some consideration has been given to the question as. 
to whether trade diversion always results in lowering of welfare, 
(xnd it is now accepted that this is not necessarily so. The 
line of argument may be summarised as follows: when a customs 
5^/ It may.be noted that this approach leads virtually auto-
matically to the conclusion that Welfare is maximised under 
free trade conditions. 
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union is foi'med some dutiable goods fovmevly imported fi-oiti 
outside sources will be replaced by the same goods imported 
from a partnex' aoitnf-^y,, duty-free but at a higher real coot. 
The shift to a higher-cost source of supply tends to lower 
the country's real income, and consequently consumer welfare; 
but the tariff reduction also works as removal of a constraint 
on consumption and may raise welfare. If the second effect is 
favourable^ and outweighs the first effect, there is a net rise 
in welfare, < 
Conceptually at least there can be new trade creation 
without trade diversion. Such a case would apply to com-
modities which one of the members will now newly import from 
a partner (but which it did not formerly import at all) because 
the price of the protected domestic product is now lower than 
the price at any foreign source plus the duty. Equally it is 
conceptually possible for a customs union to have no new trade-
creating effect and only trade-diverting effect. This might 
occur where the common tariff shuts off foreign sourcoa of 
supply^ unci inaidú the union O3:ioting industries acquire a 
new net of cus tomers in partner countries without undergoing 
any significant change (as would be expected to happen if the 
industries were to meet new competition originating from 
partner countries). 
As a consequence of the large attention paid to those 
trade effects, there is strong support for the view that the 
primary purpose of a customs union^ and its major consequence, 
is to ohift ooux'oes of oupplij. What io more, the ohift can he 
either to lower-cost ov to highev-cost souraeo depending on the 
oiraumstanaea. Where intra-union supplies are substituted for 
tower-'eoot foreign imports, the shift is to higher-cost sources. 
But account also has to be taken of shifts between the partners. 
In this case a customs union would increase welfare to the 
extent that it diverts trade from lower-cost foreign to higher-
cost partner sources. This approach of course emphasises the 
trade aspect, without taking account of inter-commodity sub-
stitution, changes in the terms of trade, and other effects 
of the customs union arrangements. , 
The traditional postulation that trade diversion 
invariably reduces welfare has been further modified by the 
recognition that there is a welfare increasing effect where 
the trade diversion results also in inter-commodity substitution. 
The welfare increasing effect is maximised when the rate 
of subsi-itution in consumption equates the product 
transfox'mation rate. 
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Furthei\ lOhevú tkeve io VaY'iahilitij of pvoduocian^tlioiii'tiion 
of trade oan veoult in welfavo gaina^ not onhj in the pavtuai' 
aountrioiU alo o in the "home" oountt'ij, Thfi main r^v'-íxultn 
of ouch analyuma have hoan to domonntiuibe hou indeioi'minato 
the trade offeato can be, the outcome depending on the cir-
cumstancea of the countriea in the union. 
99. A further aspeat to take account of is that when a 
custoina union operates more to dLvei't trade fi'Oin ito previoui) 
channel a, I'ather than to create neo) trade, the internal 
remooal of duties operates to increase the protective effect 
(for high-cost producero) of the duties which remain. Thia 
is a consequence achieved not by reducing imports into their 
own national territory, but by extending the operation of 
the protective duty in their favour to the territories of the 
partner countries in the customs union. 
100. If therefore one sums up the orthodox view of customs 
union the general line of economic reasoning would run: 
When a customs union is formed^ the tariff is taken off imports 
from the partner countries and the relative price between 
these gyods and domestic goods is brought into confoivnity with 
the real rates of transformation. This by itself tends to 
increase welfare. But on the other hand, the relative price 
between imports from union partners and imports from the 
outside world are moved away from equality with real rates of, 
transformation. This by itself tends to reduce welfare. 
The shift to imports from union partners therefore involves 
both a gain and a loss. But what most matters is the relation 
between imports from the outside world and expenditure on intra-
union commodities. The larger the purchases of intra-union 
commodities and the smaller the purchases from the outside world, 
the more likely it is that the union will bring gain. 
101. This welfare argument gives rise to two general con-
clusions - first that given a country's volume of international 
trade a customs union is more likely to raise welfare the higher 
the proportion of trade with the country's union partners, 
and the lower the proportion with the outside world. The 
second -in that a customs union is more likely to raise welfare 
the lower is the total volume of foreign trade; for the lower 
the level of foreign trade, the lower must be purchases from 
the outside world relative to purchases of intra-union com-
modities. This means that the sort of countries who ought j| ' 
! 
!i 
' j I 
I 
* 
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to fovn ouatoms unions are those doing a high propot'tion of 
their trade with their union pai^tners, and making a high 
proportion of their total expenditure on inbra-union trade. 
^ Countries which are likely to lose from a auatoma union, on the 
other hand, are those countries in whi-h a low proportion of 
total trcde ia domestic, especially if the cuatomo union does 
not include a high proportion of their foreign trade. 
Further Conceptual Considerations 
10'¿. It would be gathered from the foregoing that most of 
the enquiries into customs union had been confined mainly to 
studying the effects of customs unions on welfare, rather than 
for example, on the level of economic activity, the balance of 
payments, or the rate of inflation. This aspect assumes 
importance when it is recognised that gains and leases may 
arise from a number' of different sources, among which may be 
included: 
(i) new trade creation and/or trade 
diversion; 
(ii) specialisation of production due to 
comparative advantages; 
(Hi) economises of scale; 
! 
; • , . , ; , I . . 
(iv) changes in the terms of trade; ; 
(v) forced changes in efficiency due to 
increased competition; 
; (vi) changes in the rates of economic growth 
in and among the partner countries. 
By and large the analyses of customs unions have been almost 
completely confined to investigations of (i) and (ii) above, 
with some slight attention to (Hi) and (iv). The item (vi) 
has scarcely received attention, while (v) is usually ruled 
out of the enquiries by the assumption (often contradicted 
^ by the facto) that production is carried out by processes which 
are technically efficient. 
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103. The pvout-diii revolver, avaund the difficulty of dcfinituj 
i,heiKi-hcv effects of customo union operaiiono an additional to 
creation and trade divcra ion, i-athex' i,han ao componcnL ¡mvir. 
of the tvada affoata. h'ov example, when there in inítiní pro-
duction in seveval partners., and the union allows one or two, 
to cap ive the entire union market, the replacement of hiijhei'-
coot partner production with lower-cos t domestic p ,-oduction 
on the one hand and the reduction in the cost of produc Lion 
of domestic goods on the other, are both integral parOn of Lhc 
same phenomenon. Nevertheless it is useful to consider the 
sepa^'f-.e elements and the conditions in which they contri hute 
to (jains and losses, even while recognising that the poir.iibLe , 
gains from a customs union resulting from improvements in the 
terms of trade, economies of scale, and reductions in d i:uiuir,<:d 
unemployment, do not show up as readily as the trade effects. 
: J04. On this question of the economic benefits arising from ; 
• other causes, e.g. economies of scale, or through forced 
efficiency, there have nob been as comprehensive enquiries as 
for trade effects, nevertheless some situat ions can be identi fled 
clearly. For example, on economies of scale, it is fairly evident 
that if the market is expanding all tíie firms in a given 
industry could grow and economies of scale could be realised, 
but if the market is static then growth can he achieved only 
at the expense of competitors. (However, in making such 
evaluation a distinction has to be drawn between the costs of 
production proper, and the costs of selling - for if the cost 
of selling is rising faster than cost of production is falling, 
then there is not likely to be expansión, and eaonc-mins of tícah: 
would not be raalised). 
105. similarly, as regards possible gains through jjJiy^d 
efficiency, the thesis is that firms wlii^i may ~noirT)e~adop ting 
methodsUñown to ho teahnioally mora efficient, when thrown 
into competition with firms in partner countries, will be 
forced to adopt more technically efficient methods - and thereby 
the efficiency in the use of resources may increase, (and 
could turn out to be a significant source of gain). 
Scale of Production Effects 
106. The common assumption is that customs unions effects 
are mainly limited to trade creation and trade diversion, even 
4 
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where these effects are redefined to include both a pvodua Lion 
and a consumption component. This of couvse halda tvue for 
Industries and firmo where the money costo of production^ 
* permit of output, is increasing over the long run relative to 
* the economy as a whole. But there are firms and indn:; trica 
where the reverse is true and unit costs decrease as oulput 
expands. Jn this latter category falla the situation where a 
small country by itself may be unable to reach a scale of pro-
duction large enough to make low unit cost of production 
possible, but two or more such countries combined may provide 
a market large enough to make low unit cost production possible. 
107. However, it does not seem probable that the prospecto 
of reduction in unit costs of production (as the result of 
enlargement of the tariff area) are ordinarily substantial even 
when the individual member countries are quite small in t^conoinic 
sise; for it ia the supply conditions of factors of production 
which are the relevant restrictive factor on expansion of out" 
put if it is to be achieved without increase of unit costo. 
Unless the customs union operates so as to appreciably increase 
the inter-member mobility of factors of production, it does 
not in this sense increase the "scale" of the economy from the 
point of view of production conditions, even if it does increase 
if from the point of view of the size of the protected market 
for sales. 
Terms of Trade Effects 
108. There ia conceptually at least, the possibility of 
: • economic benefit from tariffs which countries may be able to 
exploit more effectively combined in a customs union, than if 
they operate as separate tariff areas. A customs union by 
increasing the extent of the territory which operates under 
a single tariff, tend'^ to increase the effect of the tariff 
as a means of improving the terms of trade of that area vis-a-vis 
the rest of the. world. This derives from the recognition that 
if the area is large enough to affect the terms at which 
its trade takes place, the imposition of a tariff improves 
its terms of trade. 
109. More specifically the tariff may not only divert 
consumption from imported to intra-union produced commodities, 
I but it could also alter, in favour of the tariff-levying area. 
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the rate at which its exports exaharuje for the importa which 
suvvLvo the tariff. In short it works in the direction of 
improving the terms of trade. Any improvement in I he terwr. i>f 
trade for the area, carries with it an increase to the anm 
in the total benefits from trade. The greater the economic 
area of the tariff levying unit, the greater is likely to be 
(other things being equal) the improvement in its terms of 
trade with the outside world, resulting from its tariff. But 
it has to be borne in mind equally that where the area is too 
small, to influence the external prices, it abstracts from 
the terms of trade effects, and they are not likeAy to he 
realised. 
A dm iniSt rati on Economies 
110. Finally, more practical than theoretical, arc the gains 
that may be mads through administrative economies. in rar-pooL 
of the costs to tPuclo, there are hvoadly two types of saDings 
that can ba aohioved: 
(a) reductions in the oosta involved for 
exporters and importers in meeting the 
customs requirements, (due to having one 
set of requirements in the place of 
several sets of requirements); and 
(b) reduction in the costs involved in tariff 
levying and in administering the customs 
machinery (due to the reduction in the 
proportion and volume of imports requiring 
customs inspection and clearance). 
Hi- In addition however, the customs union has the further 
effect that when the tariff frontiers are removed between 
its members, there is a reduction of adminis trative expense 
to the governments due to the frontiers between them no longer 
having to be watched for custom purposes. Given the economic 
area of the customs union, the larger number of tariff frontiers 
eliminated, the greater these administrative economies (per unit 
volume of trade). 
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1 - I!->SUf>:S ANf) OP'l'lONS_lfJJ)l;ll^PI':N INi'i fllJiJ'yiiTiirl;- UN y-'.V 
lifílAfldNlÚllF ÜJTUIN'Y'íÍí-:' O/^CS • 
112. In the first section dealing with the KCCM fi'ame-
wopk the queotions of liberalisation of internaL trade and 
the achievement of uniformity in external trade Das considered 
in the context of the Treaty pronisione and their iuiplfmen-
tation. This uaa supplemented in Che accond section hij I,ha 
similar and related questions as they apply to the OECS 
countries in the context of Caricom. The third section pfo-
oided a review of customs union concepts. In this section 
the focus is on some of the issues that derive from deepening 
üf the custotno union relationship within the 0I'!C3. 
xi^. Comparison of the EGCM arrangements with the more 
aommonlij aaoepted auetoma union criteria reveals several 
aspects on which the ECCM Agreement remained silent. There 
were no ECCM stipulations concerning: .uniform customs legis-
lation and regulations; the use of one and the same customs 
declaration for goods entering and moving within the ECCM 
area; goods imported from outside the ECCM area paying duty 
only once (at the rates fixed by the common tariff); the 
apportionment of customs revenue; or common customs service. 
Consideration now has to be given to the scope for applying 
these various elements in the particular circumstances of 
the OECS. 
114. Freedom of internal trade and the common external 
tariff (together with the prindples for its interpretation 
and the list of conditional duty exemptions and red'jctions), 
presently constitute the prime components of the ECCM customs 
union type relationship. All the other elements are at 
varying degrees of s tandardization; and overall the relation-
ship del 'ves from arrangements administered individually by 
the menibi-r territories. It should be noted too that the frame 
adopted by the ECCM common tariff does not include an agreed 
administrative code, incorporating such aspects as definition 
of value for customs purposes, or an integrated approach to 
the administration of customs operations. 
1 
115. Immediately it can he concluded that the first step 
towards a fuller customs union relationship would be to 
harmonize the customs legislation, regulations procedures, 
rules and orders. And thz second step would be to achieve the 
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highesb feasible Level of unifoivnl by in the cnn Urn:; m?)-!) i. en-, 
so that at whatever point imported goods enter the union the 
trc'-foment would he the same. * 
Need for a Common Body of Trade Law 
116. One must bear in mind that the operation of amj set 
of procedures and rules for rcrjula ting the Cun l-oiii:; Union bar, 
to be sern against the overall background of the commercial 
policy of the OECS, and the power of the OECS to enforce them. 
It is th refore relevant to point to an aspect to which not 
much attention has been given so far, that is the. necessity 
for cus^ ^"^s union arrangements to operate agai.nst a background 
of legal uniformity. The emergence of a common hotly of inw 
relati'ng to trade, especially in the interpretation and appli-
cation 3 relative to the customs union, is an essential part 
of the dynamic process. 
117. This is all the more significant when one considers 
that thp relevant ORCS Treaty provisions are general, and 
give very -little indication of the law in practice, thus only 
providing the bare bones and leaving the courts to givp it 
substance when such eventualities arise. And it must be borne 
in mind 'oo, the noi'iii is that within each OIÍCS territory the 
courts will apply the national legislation interpreted within 
its own legal framework of theory and practice. This is so 
because a common code of commercial law throughout the OECG 
region does not presently exist. 
118. It follows that initially, the formulation and 
application of this aspect of commerical law can only be seen 
and understood by examining the decisions of the OECS institution: 
and the several courts. It is very probable that a pattern 
could emerge in which, successively, reliance is placed on 
previous decisions of the OECS institutions, as a guide to the 
gradual development of greater uniforwiby in national legal 
interpretation and applioation - that is OECS decisions heaoniing 
the main source of commercial taw. 
110. Preaenbty there is no legal forum at the level of the 
OECS for handling the interpretative functions which are 
necessary for translating the decisions of the OECS institutions, 
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and for developing "case law" and making it beitev knoion and 
undefstood. But avticle 3(h) of the 0EC5 Treaty doer, pro-
vide for "co-ordination, harmonization and pursuit of .joint 
polieie:i" in matters concerning the Judiciary. According J. y 
the dcüelopinent of uniformity in thia aspect of eoinmprcia i 
law could be seen as a priority, supportive of customs union 
operations, especially as the Judiciary would not be pre-
cluded by rule or practice from taking into account the inter-
pretation and application of re leoant policy fon.". i di^ fo timi:;. 
120. The process of "co-ordination, harmonization and 
pursuit of joint policies" could well go in the direction of ' 
establishment of an DECS Court, to handle the whole range 
of legal issues that stem from, day-to-day operation of the 
many provisions of the OECS Treaty. In that situation, a 
common body of trade law supportive of the customs union 
operations would be only one dimension of the developmen t of 
an OECS legal framework including gradually a body of case law. 
121. It would seem, judging from the experience in other 
customs unions, that most of the "case law" would be likely 
to develop around the issue of "charges tJut haoa the effect 
of customs duties", Further it would seem that the degree 
of attention given to the iesue, would be directly rulatcd 
to the strength of interest of come private sector eitter-
prises in some particular products and/ox^ markets. 
Customs Legislations and Regulations 
122. This desirability of having a high measure of 
uniformity in customs legislation, and the administrative 
regulations has already been indicated in the previous 
sections of the paper. Review of the situation reveals that 
(i) the legislative instruments relative to trade take a 
variety of forms in the various OECS territories; and 
(ii) there is need for an up-dated consolidated customs law 
in virtually all the countries. In some cases the main 
instrument is a Customs Act supplemented by a Customs Duties 
Act or Ordinance, and in other cases the main instrument 
is a Trade and Revenue Act supplemented by Customs Import 
and Export Tariffs Ordinance or some such equivalent. 
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122. In the majoiHby of cases, these instruments uave 
promulgated in the lOüO's, and have had niiweroHO amendmúnbr. 
to th sections and schedules since that timo. In soma caMeo 
hoiJevsv the main inatviment goes back eoen fufthei' (in one 
case to 1920), with a fange of subsidiai^ij leijis lative inifti'u-
incntii dealing wi.th pavtioulav aspeóla of ti'ade, cua toiiir, 
administration rules, statutory trade orders, and departmental 
regulations. As a consequence it is oery difficult to obtain 
an amended up-dated text of the main instvumnnt and of the 
administrative regulations; and it is virtually impooaible 
to undertake a detailed comparison of the situation of the 
seven territories. 
124. Several of the territories have become cm'VdntI y 
engaged in reviewing the customs or trade and rpvenuo. law 
primarily because there is urgent felt need for a consolidated 
text. However it is increasingly becoming apparent that the 
new legislation which will emerge, will not be a consolidation, 
but will involve changes in the laxo. Since the original 
legislations were written,commerical practices have changed, 
patterns of trade have changed, and inevitably the admin-
istration of customs also has changed. Most important, 
the range of revenue earning taxes have widened, and import 
duties and trade procedures have increasingly become a sub-
ject of negotiation within the Caricom/ECCM frame. This 
latter aspect has stimulated a trend toward greater uniformity, 
whi ̂ h logically could in time yield the result of adoption 
by all the territories of identical legislation. With identical 
legislation conferring similar ¡jowers, the customs services 
of the OECS territr 'es would have a common working base, and 
the possibility would be opened for them to act together. 
125. A further aspect that should be noted, is the trend 
towards the framing of new customs legislation so that it 
deals with aspects of control and management, defining and 
enunciating the principles and proceudres. By this means 
it is expected that the frequent x cvisions and up-dating 
(and need for consolidation) would be substantially reduced. 
A necessary corrolary however, is that the promulgated rates 
for generating tax revenues are leg'' slated s ep.irately, these 
being revised more frequently to adjust to budgetary and 
poli 'y requirements. . , 
126. 'Similarly, where formerly a range of regulations 
often were included in the text of the law, there is 
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incveasing acceptance of the greater desirability that the 
regulations which flow from the laid be promulgated :;eparabely 
from the law. In several cases the Customs Regulations were 
part of the body of "Statutory Rules and Orders" lúhich untrc. 
Gazetted separately from the Customs Ordinance. As with the 
Customs Act, there is the high desirability to achieve the 
greatest uniformity of customs regulations within the OBCS area. 
127. It has been no easier to obtain copies of the customs 
regulations for purposes of comparative study. By and large, 
the regulations outline the particulars that need to be satis-
fied in respect of entry,warehousing, clearing and discharge 
of goods and the procedures for exportation of goods. Documen-
tation to be presented, the manner of its completion, conditions 
to be met etc. are usually spelled out, often an instructions 
to traders and customs brokers. The .measure of uniformity that 
may be achieved will very much depend on the extent to which 
there are country-spedfic elements that need to be retained. 
Some Technical Aspects 
128. Within the body of the legislations and regulations 
are a range of technical aspects, the treatment of which directly 
affect • nstoms union type operations. Most important among 
these ai <t the classification of goods which affects the 
incidence of tariff rates; the valuation of goods, which affects 
the computation of the duty; the conditions relating to refund 
of duty (drawbacks) on imported goods; and the certification 
of the origin of goods, which determine whether they get common 
market area treatment. These various technical elements which 
need to be standardized to achieve customs union operations, . i 
are usually settled by a process of negotiation. In the earlier 
sections reference was made to the cet which reflects the 
agreed classification; but adherence to the classification is 
no less important. Similarly mention was made that the ECCM 
does not indicate a common system for valuation; but within 
the wider Caricom relationship there has been a general move-
ment by the OECS territories to adopting within the legislative 
instruments a more or less uniform approach based on the 
Brussels definition of value. 
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Definibion of Value for Customs Purposes , 
129. On occasion it has been pointed out that tariff ^ 
negotiations and agreements on tariffs can he vitiated by 
changes in the methods of valuation that are applied to imports. j^I 
This is because even where agreement on tariff rates exist, i 
the incidence of the tax on the particular imported goods ! , 
can vary depending on the method of valuation applied. Concevns 
of till •• nature led the major trading nations to the a tandard-
isation, .as far as practicable, of definitions of value and 
of proceudres for determining value, and the laying down of 
principles for common international application, 
130. It is the reality tl-at agreements between countries' to 
apply the same ad valorem rates of duty are of doubtful efficacy • .„ 
unless the provisions and processes relating to the valuatioii l ; 
of goods in the countries participating in such agreements so ' 
operate that the incidence of the agreed rates on imported 
goods cannot be varied unilaterally simply by varying the 
Valuation system. For this reason it is essential that countries 
which comprise a customs union apply a common definition, since i 
the object of the union would not be achieved, if valuation in , 
the countries concerned were based on different definitions 
••(and applications) of value. 
151. The foregoing consideration has to be seen in the light 
that for customs union (and other such trading associations and 
even for national trade), where the provision of protection 
against imported goods from third countries is a substantial 
consideration, ad valorem duties are preferred above specific 
duties. Ad valorem duties offer the advantages of being 
better able to cope with fluctuating prices and graduations of 
quality. 
132. The general intention of adopting a standard definition 
of value, is to provide a basis for the preparation of 
statutory definitions which would apply to all transactions, 
whoever the parties to them may be, and whatever their conditions. 
One objective therefore is to induce a higher measure of uniformity 
in legislation, and beyond that to achieve uniformity in 
application. The Brussels Definition of Value for Customs ^ 
Purposes, has been widely adopted as the standard definition, 
and currently applies to the bulk of goods passing in international 
trade. 'More recently however, attention has turned to the GATT . 
Customs Valuation Code as the basis for customs valuation. ' 
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133. The initial purpose of applying a standard definition 
of Vatue^ waa to ensure at national level, a single formula to 
be applied uniformly to all alaases of importation, mo an to 
have consistency in valuation and to ensure equitable, impartial 
treatment as between all imported goods. As regards the 
Brussels Definition of Value, it is not without significance 
that in its development one purpose was to get a definition of 
value suitable for use in customs unions. Even where countries 
are not in ouch trading associations, and even though the 
methods and procedures for the application of the definition 
of value necessarily vary according to the administrative 
organisation of the country concerned, nevertheless there is 
the tendency towards some uniformity from country to country, 
in the legislations based on the Definition. In the circum-
stances of Customs Unions however, uniformity of application 
is paramount and requires more than the adoption of an iJantiaal 
text. 
The Current Definition of Value 
134. The OECS territories generally adopted the Brussels 
definition that imported goods should be valued at the price 
that they "would fetch at the time when the duty becomes pay-
able at the point of entry on a open market sale between buyer 
and seller independent of each other", so that price is the 
sole consideratton. The essentTal eTement is that the seller 
bears all costs, changes and expenses incidental to the sale 
and to delivery of the goods so that the price is inclusive of 
those components. In practice this means the cost of the 
goods plus insurance freight (the GIF price). In some cases 
checks may need to be made to ensure that commissions, brokerage 
fees, special discounts etc are included in the CIF price. 
The purpose is to discount the influence upon the valudtion 
of any special discounts or rebates that may exist between buyer 
and seller^ hut not freely available to all buyers so as to 
avoid discrimination among importers. 
135. It is of no less significance to note that the value 
for customs purposes would not include delivery charges from 
the port, or the amount of any internal tax, or traderé mark-up. 
Consequently it would not correspond to commercial prices within 
the country, which include such elements. In short the Brussels 
Definition does not allow customs valuation by use of internal 
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prices in the country of exportation or of the priaeo of 
national goods in the country of importation. Thin implies 
that where the "open market price" loould he affeatad by the * 
quantity^ or the quality, or the level of tramuiotion (i.e. i 
whole sale or retail) these have to be taken into aonounL Lti t 
the valuation for customs purposes. 
136. By 1 November 1969 all the OECS berritori-ea (exoepbinrj 
St. Lucia) were already listed among the countries applying 
the Brussels Definition of Value^ by the Customs Co-operation 1 
Council. (More recent listing would no doubt show all the 
OECS territories as included in that category, valuation in the 
St. Lucia Customs (Amendment) Act No. 9 of 197Z being obvioucAy 
based on the Brussels Definition). The essential conniderahion 
is then not so much to advocate adoption of the principle of 
having a standard definition of value through the OECS/ECCM 
area^ as to achieve a common application. The point ia that 
lack of uniformity even in application of a common definition 
could lead to undeaired trade diversions. 
137. As in several other aspects however, action within the 
OECS is in large measure pre-conditioned by decisions and 
commitments of the OECS territories at the Caricom level. 
Subsequent to the agreement in the Tokyo round of Multi-lateral 
Trade Negotiations to implement a new CATT Customs Valuation 
Code in place of the Brussels Definition of Value )for purposes 
of customs valuation), the Caricom Common Market Council of 
Ministers agreed to adhere to the GATT Customs Valuation Code, ' i 
The OECS territories participated in that decision. Further, 
while not being contracting parties to the GATT there would 
seem to be some obligation, as de facto members of GATT, to j 
introduce the new system of valuation. 1 
138. This course of action would require adjustments in the ' | 
domestic legislation, in the customs regulations and in the \ 
custr>ms administration. Very evidently the adherence of^ , '' 
non-K.ECS-Caricom countries to the GATT Customs Valuation Code 
(some of those countries being Contracting Parties to the GATT), 
would result in a duality in valuation practices in Caricom, 
if the OECS countries did not also adhere to the Code. fn the . i 
circumstances it would seem that adopting the new code wóuld ' 
be an element in the development of the OECS Customs unio[n,.. 
relationship.: •M''!' 'IN. r 
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The Indicated Actions 
139. For the purpose of achieoing fuller ainsbomn union 
operations within the OECS/ECCM it can be accepted Lhat all 
the participating countries already accept the principle that 
there should be a standard definition of value and apply it 
to the fullest degreó. What seems necessary is to determine 
the extent of uniformity in (i) the domeotio leffintaiiona 
and their interpretationa{ (ii) the ouatumti prooedurmx ami 
practices as they relate to the valuation of impofiod ijfOihi; 
(Hi) the degree of implementation aa between Iha count rl 
comprising the OECS/ECCM, 
140. As regards national legislation^ so far the gnunral 
pattern has been to amend the text of the Definition hy 
providing the explanatory provisions that are considered 
necessary. In addition the need to give the legal form required 
to render it operative in domestic law, is often met by adding 
complementary provisions clarifying the purport of the definition. 
The extent to which this resulted in a measure of diauniformity 
in interpretation has not been established. The desirability 
for uniformity of interpretation throughout the customs union 
area cannot be questioned. It well may be that there is need 
for an "advisorn bodu" to ensure effective uniformity in 
interpretation and application of the valuation process. 
141. Beyond the legislations and interpretations, lie the 
customs regulations that detail the procedures and practices. 
It is in this area that uniformity in application of a standard 
definition to value has to be ensured^ to achieve precise and 
uniform valuation of imported goods throughout the area of 
the customs union. Not only has the administration of customs 
valuation got to be uniform and impartial, but it also has to 
be such that traders are able to estimate with a reasonable 
degree of certainty the value pr customs purposes. This 
.requires that importers should know before-hand how the 
Definition of Valuation applies to their particular importations -
(i.e. the adjustments that would be made to arrive at the 
valuation for customs purposes where the actual commercial 
conditioñB under uHoh the goods are imported varied from the 
notional conditions under whioh the value is to be determined}, 
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Treatment of "Drawbacks" etc. 
142. Pavallel with uniform assessment and impoaibion of ,, 
duty is the need for a high degree of uniformity in the 
treatment of reliefs from duty^ abatement of duty, and the con-
ditions for drawbacks and rebates. To the extent that;-,the V 
variations in application, as between the territories, is 
substantial, it serves to reduce the effectiveness of the 
customs union arrangement. 
142. The provisions in the national legislations that 
apply for granting drawback of the duty paid on the importation 
of goods in respect of their being exported or put on board an 
aircraft or ship for use as stores, are broadly the same. 
Also there is great similarity in the conditions concerning 
deterioration or damage of goods, their packaging etc., and 
drawback in respect of returned goods. It would seeem that 
the main area of differences relate to goods used in local 
manufacture. 
144. Directly related to this is the implementation of 
the conditional duty exemptions and reductions, which it was 
earlier pointed out remained in the discretion of the indivi-
dual governments. Studies done in OECS/EAS suggest that 
in some territories the practice was to be very liberal in 
granting exemptions. While those studies were concerned with 
the revciue effect, it must be pointed out that from the 
customs union standpoint substantial variations of application 
between the countries could result in some trade distortion. 
Where the control mechanisms are not sufficiently strict to 
ensure tint such imported goods do not pass directly to . • i 
internal trade, the objective of common treatment of imports • 
from third countries is frustrated. ! . , I ¡ h j'i 
Single Treatment of Imports 
145. In an earlier section it was indicated that some I 
customs union arrangements there have included provision for h 
adjustment for revenue losses. In such cases it is not un~ j * 
usual to have also arrangements for single treatment of foreign ; r 
goods imported into the customs union area. There are no j » 
provisions in the ECCM Agreement corresponding to the concepts 
that foreign goods entering the ECCM area would (a) require 
only one and the same customs declaration and (b) pay only <. 
I : 
' I, 
' i 
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once the vates fixed by the common tariff. In practice 
these concepts are met in part by the regulations governing 
re-exports of goods, which normally are treated differently 
J from retained imports. Invariably the arrangements are 
that re-exports are held in-bond for onward transmission to 
f the destination country,with customs duty paid at the destination. 
Immediately it would be noted that these arrangements require 
two sets of declaration - first at the entrepot port and 
second at the p o r t of final des tination. 
146. ilenerally, where goods entered and duty paid, if later 
re-exported to another ECCM country is again liable for duty, 
(even if it is on a depreciated value). In some cases it 
may be possible for drawback of duty paid to be obtained in 
the first country, but this depends on meeting the condi tionr. 
that apply to refunds of duty. Obviously where the countries 
in a customs union are contiguous sharing a land mass, it is ' \ 
easier to adopt the single treatment approach because of the 
greater ease of policing the area. On balance it does seem 
that the alternative of arrangements for warehousing are 
better suited to the circumstances of the OECS territories. 
However, as pointed out earlier,there are subs tantial differences ] 
in those provisions and regulations, in the main deriving from j 
the country-specific situations. Further the extent to which 
this may be an important customs union consideration depends 
on trade patterns and transport linkages. 
Allocation of Customs Revenues 
147. Inevitably the abolition of import duties on goods 
moving within any customs union or common market arrangement 
results in revenue losses for the participating countries. 
In addition there may be some further losses of x'evenue 
deriving from application of a common external tariff, depend-
ing on its general level and structure as compared to the 
previously applied national tariff. Allied to this is the 
change in the proportions collected by each of the parti-
cipating countries resulting from the changed customs boundary. 
To compensate for this it is not unusual for some achcmo of 
customs revenue reallocation to be adopted. 
148. As pointed out, the ECCM has no provision for customs 
revenues reallocation. On the freeing of internal trade and 
debate: i 
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the introduction of the common external tariff, the indioidual 
territories sought to offset the revenue losses by the adoption 
of consumption taxes. The question of all ooation of rxn Loiiir. • 
roocnuea was broached at least once in the p.arlu ncirjotial-ionn '' 
of the ECCM Agreement, hut it did not become a subject of  
Accordingly, no concessions were made on this point, and 
there seems to have been little concern since then to consider 
this aspect as an important issue. 
150. The rationale for this situation would seem to stem 
largely from the fact that the ECCM territories are not con-
tiguous, and as such each and every one had to retain defined 
customs boundaries and full customs operations. Further, in 
each territory the hulk of imports have been for consump L ion 
witin the territory, and not for transmission to «<?/«.; othcv 
destination territory within the ECCM area. It follows that 
the conceptual "allocation of customs revenues according to 
place of consumption" i s largely met by the logic of the 
situation, each territory retaining the collected customs 
revenues and defraying its own customs administration cxpenaeis. 
. Adjiiinistration of Customs 
151. Regarding present exercise of authority in customs 
matters, each Government retains full authority for adminis-
tration of customs within its territory and legislative j 
authority over those aspects on which the ECCM Agreement is 
silent. With regard to those matters provided in the Agree-
ment, the Economic Affairs Committee of the OECS as the 
principal organ of the common market, makes the decisions con-
cerning intra-ECCM and extra-ECCM trade. There is no customs 
council as such, the common market policy and legislation 
including changes in the common tariff being arrived at by 
negotiations in which all the participating states have equal 
status. 
152. Given the recognition that the quality of customs 
administration in each country affects the overall effectiveness 
of the union, there is the desirability for the closest colla-
boration in maintaining high quality in administering the ^ 
customs in each country. As pointed out in the third section, 
there are several alternative means for achieving this, the ' 
ultimate form being a unified customs service. It was also 
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pointed out that the two elements of policy decision making 
and day-to-day operations have to be addreoeed; the ffO'iiier' 
tending to he a move aentralitsed function hliiin iha lalLi't'. 
153. In the civoumstanoes of the 0EC5 tei'pitovioú tumh 
with its separate customs service, there La an urgent 
for some central mechanism to deal with the policy aspects of 
trade from the standpoint of matters crucial to the functioning 
of the Comptrollers of Customs. If a Cit r, j am s "Co u n a 11" Wf-rc; 
put in place, then it could he the means for co-ordinating 
the numerous technical elements, and facilitating the approach 
to uniformity and greater standardisation in the areas and to 
the extent that is deemed feasible. Immediately the Comptrollers 
of Customs could be a nucleus for such a body, addresr.ing 
themselves to formulating and implementing decisions for 
advancing the customs union. 
154. On the other question of having equally high quality 
of day-to-day customs operation throughout the union, an 
obvious approach would be a mechanism that allows for exchange 
of cur.toms officers. This however introduces a range of other 
considerátions, not the least of which is the varying nature 
of the separate services, and also the fact that each is part 
of the larger civil service administration. Such exchanges 
would of course be a normal feature of a unified customs 
service. Whether or not such approaches can be accepted depend 
on a very wide range of considerations, and would demand high 
governmental commitments. 
155. It should not be assumed at the outset that such 
measures would yield administrative economies. It should be 
borne in mind that a customs union results in the elimination 
for administrative purposes of tariff frontiers, only if and 
to the extent that the territories are contiguous. The 
existí nee between the territories of "high seas" is sufficient 
to reduce whatever potential there is for administrative ' 
economies deriving from the union. Unless the territories 
comprising the customs union are contiguous, the customs union 
arrangement cannot make any significant contribution to the 
reduction of costs incurred in administering tariff'frontiers. .! 
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156. ¡;'urthei\ it has to be recognised that administrative 
changes introduced would not all involve economies. To the 
extent that there are: additional burdens of negotiation; 
the need to maintain a machinery for the co-ordination of « 
customs administration codes; provisions for mutual super- ^ 
vision where this is deemed desirable; or maoh inerij for the 
settlement of disputes - there would be reductions in any net 
financial benefits that might be gained. It also follows^ if 
(a) there are no substantial gains from redunt-ion of nutiLt^iim 
inspections and trade frontiers administration^ and (b) ihnx-a 
are added costs attributable to co-ordination i-equiremon L¡>, 
that there could be the result of a higher cost of adminis-
tration. 
Concluding Remarks 
167. In the foregoing the various elements have been con-
sidered singly, but it is of utmost importance to appreciate 
that in their operaton they are not independent of each other. 
For example, if one assumes the OECS territories to be at a 
stage of full customs union relationship, then materials that 
enter duty paid at one port (say St. John's) and are pro-
cessed within the area may qualify for drawback as the result 
of finsished product exported from another port (say Plymouth). 
Given implementation of an OECS common policy of export 
encouragement that includes the granting of drawbacks, then 
arrangement would need to be in place for drawback granted at 
Plymouth to be recovered against the duty paid at St. John's. 
Of course, if a system for reallocation of revenues were 
already operative, it should take such a circumstance into 
account and then there would not be need for a special arrange-
ment to deal with drawback. 
158. In the same vein, it would be seen that as the customs 
union relationship deepens (with high level of unification in 
the administration of customs etc) the less important become 
the need for rules of origin applying to intra-OECS trade. 
159, Such consider'ations bring into sharp focus the 
operation of the common external tariff of the union, not only 
in termft of its level, but also in terms of its structure. 
Detei'mi 'ation of what is appropriate would need to be made in' 
the light not only of the policies that apply to trade, but 
also those policies that apply to industrialization and the 
overall development process. 


